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The potential financial vulnerability that can occur when private
sector or government agents acquire high levels of foreign currency
debt has been at the center of discussion since the financial crises that
affected the countries of Southeast Asia in the late 1990s. To the extent
that a mismatch is generated in the denomination of assets and liabilities,
foreign currency debt increases agents’ vulnerability to fluctuations in
the exchange rate. After a depreciation, the debt-asset ratios increase,
interest rates rise in relation to income and access to new debt is limited.
For firms in the private sector (especially those that operate in the
nontradable sector), these balance sheet effects reduce output and
investment and, in extreme cases, lead to the bankruptcy of firms and
financial instability.
Measuring the empirical relevance of these negative effects of
foreign currency debt is particularly important for the conduct of
monetary and exchange rate policies in emerging markets. In
conventional open-economy models à la Mundell-Fleming, exchange
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rate depreciations have an expansionary effect on domestic output. It
follows that in the face of a contraction of foreign demand or a reduction
of international liquidity, monetary authorities should reduce domestic
interest rates and let the exchange rate depreciate in order to stabilize
output. The expansionary effect of the depreciation of the peso may be
reversed, however, if firms are highly indebted in dollars and the
balance sheet effects are significant. Under these circumstances, the
optimal policy response to a negative external shock would be a tight
monetary policy and a strong defense of the peso.1
A growing literature, using aggregate data, finds empirical evidence
that justifies this concern about the effects of the mismatches generated
by the dollar debt. In particular, evidence shows that both dollarization
of external liabilities and dollarization of the domestic financial system
are correlated with increased volatility of output and capital flows and
with greater financial vulnerability. Moreover, external dollarization
reduces the expansionary effects of a depreciation and makes a sudden
stop in capital flows more likely.2
In contrast to the macroeconomic literature, a second group of
studies based on firm-level data obtains ambiguous results on the impact
of a depreciation on investment and output of firms with dollar debt.3
1. Although they suffer problems of endogeneity, a couple of studies argue
that the dollarization of liabilities leads to a “fear of floating” the domestic currency.
Panizza, Hausmann, and Stein (2001) find that countries that are able to borrow
externally in their own currencies allow greater fluctuations of the exchange rate
relative to fluctuations of the interest rate and their reserves. Along a similar line
of research, Levy Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Reggio (2003), using de facto and de
jure classifications of the exchange rate, find that the level of dollar liabilities
(relative to the money supply) is positively correlated with the probability of fixing
the exchange rate.
2. McKinnon and Pill (1998) document that many of the Asian economies that
experienced financial crises in the second half of the 1990s maintained high levels
of dollar debt. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) find that domestic bank
dollarization, measured by the sum of dollar deposits and foreign loans, increases
the likelihood of a sudden stop in net capital inflows. Levy Yeyati (2003, 2005)
shows that a banking crisis is more likely after a currency depreciation in countries
in which domestic banks are highly dollarized, and these countries also have more
volatile output growth rates. Céspedes (2004) provides evidence that exchange
rate depreciations have a less expansionary effect when the level of dollar debt is
higher. Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003) show that countries with a
higher proportion of dollar-denominated foreign debt have more volatile growth
of output and capital flows, and their sovereign debt obtains lower ratings from
the rating agencies. Finally Arteta (2003) presents evidence in the opposite
direction. This author does not find statistically significant evidence that
dollarization in the domestic banking system makes a banking crisis more likely.
3. For a detailed summary of the literature on balance sheet effects from dollar
debt, see Galindo, Panizza, and Schiantarelli (2003) and Bleakley and Cowan (2005).
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This ambiguity has two possible explanations. The first is that currency
mismatches are not quantitatively important, and the macroeconomic
evidence is therefore likely to be capturing omitted variables, correlated
with the level of dollarization, which are the true determinants of the
financial volatility and vulnerability. The second explanation relates to
the endogeneity of the currency composition of the debt. This explanation
has two components. The first relates to the use that this literature
makes of the dollar debt as a proxy for currency mismatches. If the
firms that maintain dollar debt are also the firms whose income is
highly correlated with the real exchange rate, then dollar debt will be a
bad measure of the currency mismatch. The second component relates
to the endogeneity of currency mismatch decisions. In particular, if
firms with strong mismatches are precisely those for which the balance
sheet effects are less important, depreciations could be expected to have
a small effect on their output and investment levels.
In this study, we argue that the lack of conclusive empirical results
at the firm level is due to the endogeneity of the debt choice, not to the
absence of a balance sheet effect. To test this, we construct a new
database of around 200 firms in the Chilean nonfinancial sector, which
includes information on the currency composition of their liabilities,
assets, and revenue and their net currency derivative positions. As far
as we know, this is the first database that includes such detailed
information on the currency mismatches on and off the balance sheet
of firms in an emerging economy.
Our main result is that after we adequately control for differences
in the composition of assets and revenue and for the net derivatives
position, we find a significant balance sheet effect in the sample of
Chilean firms. In other words, currency mismatch is important. We
also find that currency derivatives play a role in isolating firms’
investment decisions from currency shocks and that the balance sheet
effect is smaller for firms that a priori we think have fewer constraints
on access to credit.
On the choice of dollar debt, we find evidence of currency hedging
among the Chilean firms. Firms in Chile hedge the currency composition
of their liabilities, assets, and revenue, and they take derivative positions
if they do not have a “real” hedge.4 This is why dollar debt is higher in
firms with dollar assets and in firms that export part of their sales. We
4. This result is consistent with the results obtained for Asia by Allayanis
and Weston (2001).
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also find that currency exposure is negatively correlated with measures
of credit constraints and a measure of investment opportunities.5 This
suggests that the firms that are the most exposed to exchange rate risk
are the best prepared for taking this risk.
A key question when considering the determinants of dollar debt is
the role of exchange rate policy. By increasing the variance of the real
exchange rate in the short and medium terms, a flexible exchange rate
policy increases the relative risk of the dollar debt, inclining the balance
in favor of the peso debt. In line with this hypothesis, we find significant
changes in the level of currency exposure after the implementation of a
floating exchange rate regime in Chile in 1999. This fall is significant,
even after we control for interest rate differentials.
1. EFFECTS AND DETERMINANTS OF CURRENCY
MISMATCHES: A SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE
Several empirical studies use firm-level data to test the presence of
a balance sheet effect generated by the increase in the peso value of
dollar-denominated debt due to the depreciation of the exchange rate.
At first sight, the results are not conclusive. Some studies find that, in
the period immediately after a devaluation, dollar-indebted firms do
not invest relatively less than firms with peso-denominated debt. Other
articles conclude that the balance sheet effect is, in fact, important and
statistically significant. The former group includes the work of Bleakley
and Cowan (2005). In a sample of 450 nonfinancial firms from five
Latin American countries, the authors do not find a negative and
significant effect of dollar debt on investment following a depreciation.
The authors argue that this result is due to the fact that firms hedge
the composition of their liabilities with their assets and revenue, so a
currency devaluation leads to an increase not only in the peso value of
the debt, but also in the income received and the value of their assets.
These results are confirmed by Bonomo, Martins, and Pinto (2003) using
a sample of Brazilian firms; Benavente, Johnson, and Morandé (2003)
using a sample of Chilean firms; and Echeverry and others (2003) using
a large sample of Colombian firms (around 8,000). None of these studies
finds a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction between
dollar debt and exchange rate depreciation. Luengnaruemitchai (2004)
5. Measured as the deviations of dollar debt net of derivatives from the levels
predicted by a simple regression between debt in dollars, assets in dollars, and exports.
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studies the impact of depreciations on investment in nonfinancial firms
in Asia, the region that brought the risks associated with currency
mismatches to the forefront of the discussion following the financial
crisis in the region in the late 1990s (see McKinnon and Pill, 1998).
Again, it is not possible to identify a negative and significant effect of
the interaction between dollar debt and the rate of currency depreciation.
There are several possible explanations for this lack of results. The
first relates to the way in which currency exposure is measured.
Although the firms with more dollar debt are affected by a contractionary
balance sheet effect, this could be offset by a competitiveness effect
derived from the fact that they have dollar-denominated assets or that
their income is positively correlated with the currency depreciations.
Consistent with this hypothesis, studies that control for the
competitiveness effect find that the most dollar-indebted firms invest
relatively less immediately after a depreciation—that is, after controlling
for the competitiveness effect, there is a negative and significant balance
sheet effect (Aguiar, 2002; Pratap, Lobato, and Somuano, 2003).
The second explanation relates to the endogeneity of currency
exposure decisions. In particular, an extensive theoretical literature,
as well as a growing empirical literature, maintains that firms
determine their optimal level of risk exposure based on their
vulnerability to situations of financial distress and their set of investment
possibilities. Froot, Sharfstein, and Stein (1993) develop a model in which
the cost of financial distress is the loss of investment opportunities. In
this context, currency hedging reduces the cost of external financing
and mitigates the problems of underinvestment described by Myers
(1977). The implication is that firms will increase their currency
hedging if they are vulnerable to critical financial situations or have
better investment opportunities. In the context of the literature on
balance sheet effects and currency exposure, this means that the
investment decisions of firms with a high level of currency exposure
could be less sensitive to balance sheet effects.
From the empirical point of view, firm-level studies that seek to
explain firms’ hedging decisions center mainly on the use of
derivatives. Gezcy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), and Allayanis and
Ofeck (2001), using data from 500 nonfinancial U.S. firms listed in
Forbes, find that derivative use is positively correlated with
investment opportunities, measured by expenditure on research and
development, firm size, and the interaction between firm leverage and
the market-to-book ratio (a measure of investment opportunities); and
negatively correlated with the level of firm liquidity, measured by the
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quick ratio. Bartram, Brown, and Fhele (2004) use data on currency,
interest rate, and commodity derivatives on 7,000 nonfinancial firms
in forty-eight countries; they find that the firms that use currency
derivatives the most also have income generated by foreign sales, are
listed on foreign stock exchanges, or have foreign-currency-denominated
debt. Firms also use currency hedging more if they have higher
leverage, lower quick ratios, and higher market-to-book ratios.
Finally, Allayanis, Brown, and Klapper (2001) study currency
hedging in nonfinancial firms from eight Asian economies over the
1996–98 period. In contrast to the U.S. studies, the evidence reported
does not support the hedging theories described above. The authors
find that liquidity-constrained firms and firms with higher investment
opportunities do not use derivatives more and that currency derivatives
are substitutes for foreign-currency revenue generated by sales. They
also find that firms in countries with sufficiently large interest rate
differentials have a lower level of hedging, which suggests that in
this case firms trade off the higher risks of currency hedging with the
benefits of cheap foreign credit.
2. CURRENCY MISMATCHES, BALANCE SHEET EFFECTS,
AND HEDGING IN NONFINANCIAL FIRMS
The empirical strategy in our framework is based on the estimation
of a hedging equation at the firm level. The estimation is derived from
a simple mean-variance framework in which we assume that the firm’s






where β* is the ratio of dollar debt to assets; α is the share of firm
assets that produce foreign currency operational income; τ + ε is the
expected interest rate differential between domestic and foreign currency
debt, which we assume has an aggregate component τ, and a firm level
idiosyncratic component ε; μ is a measure of firm risk aversion; and σz
is the variance of the real exchange rate.
In the absence of interest rate differentials (τ + ε = 0), the firm will
choose the currency composition of its debt to match that of its assets
(net operational income). However, if there are differential costs between
peso and dollar borrowing, they will choose to carry some foreign
exchange exposure in their balance sheet in order to reduce their expected
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borrowing costs. In other words, if there is a gap between domestic and
foreign borrowing costs adjusted for expectations τ or if the firm has
some idiosyncratic advantage that allows it cheaper access to foreign
currency debt ε, then a currency mismatch will result. For a given
interest rate differential, the size of this mismatch is decreasing in the
expected volatility of the exchange rate, σz, and the degree of the firm’s
risk aversion, μ.
We start by measuring the size and significance of balance sheet
effects on investment in Chilean firms in section 4. Our specific
empirical strategy is to assess whether firms with more dollar debt
invest relatively less in the aftermath of a depreciation. We do so by
estimating reduced-form equations for fixed capital investment. The
proposed mechanism centers on the interaction of alternative measures
of currency mismatch with shifts in the exchange rate. Thus the key
variable in our analysis in this section is for firm i in period t:
,1 FOREIGN DEBT lnEXCHANGE RATE it t − ×Δ .
If firms are behaving according to equation (1), foreign currency
debt will be a poor measure of currency exposure in the balance sheet.
If firms systematically match the currency composition of their assets
and income α, with that of their liabilities β, then empirical estimates
of the balance sheet effects based on dollar debt alone will be biased
upwards, as firms holding high shares of dollarized debt see the largest
increases in profits following a depreciation. We therefore augment this
basic specification with a series of controls for α, using firm level data
on exports, foreign assets, and net derivative positions.
In section 5, we examine the extent of matching between foreign
currency assets, income, and liabilities directly within the cross-section
of firms in our sample. First, we check the relation between foreign
currency debt, net derivative usage, and the currency composition of
assets and net income at the firm level. Next, we check whether variables
that the corporate finance literature argues are correlated with firm
risk aversion, μ, explain deviations in observed debt composition levels
from the matching composition. Since we do not directly observe firm-
level values of α, we look at the absolute value of deviations of β from
the level predicted by the matching equations estimated in the previous
subsection and correlate these deviations with proxies for μ.
Finally, in section 6, we analyze how the change in the
macroeconomic policy regime in Chile in the late 1990s affected foreign
currency hedging by firms. As is evident from equation (1), monetary
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and exchange rate policy affects the extent of hedging in firms through
its impact on the economywide interest rate differential τ, and the
exchange rate volatility σz. A key component of the new policy regime
was the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime. This caused both
an increase in exchange rate volatility and a compression of interest
rate differentials. Therefore, we expect the level of currency exposure
of Chilean firms to decline after the shift to the floating exchange rate
regime in the late 1990s. We further test whether the decline was
larger for firms that are likely to be more risk averse because of capital
market imperfections. In the final section, we attempt to separate the
effects of changes in interest differential from changes in exchange
rate volatility after 1999.
3. THE DATABASE
Our data consist of firm-level accounting information for nonfinancial
corporations in Chile for the period 1995 to 2003. We also have data on
firm exports, sectors in which the firms operate, and ownership. Our
main source of information is the Chilean Superintendency of Securities
and Insurance (the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, or
SVS),which requires all firms categorized as corporations to disclose
their accounting information using a standardized format (the Ficha
Estadística Codificada y Uniforme, or FECU). We use nonconsolidated
data, so that investments in subsidiaries are reported in a separate
account and not as a part of the aggregate stock of fixed assets.
Data on the currency composition of liabilities and assets is not
recorded directly in the FECUs, but is reported in the notes attached to
each firm’s annual financial statistics. These notes are not standardized
and are not available in an electronic format. We therefore start with
the data on foreign currency liabilities assembled by Benavente, Johnson,
and Morandé (2003).6 We then input data on foreign currency assets
and derivatives collected from each of the notes mentioned above.
For our estimates, we use a sample restricted to the nonfinancial
firms for which foreign-currency data are available. Table 1 shows the
number of observations in the final sample per year, as well as
descriptive statistics for the main variables we use. The size of the
sample changes as new firms are incorporated into the SVS database.
6. This database is part of a broader effort by the IDB to put together data on
firm-level currency composition of liabilities. For more details, see Galindo, Panizza,
and Schiantarelli (2003).
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Standard
Variable Observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Investment in fixed capital 1,326 0.038 0.149 –2.200 1.071
   over lagged assets
Dollar debt over lagged assets 1,183 0.093 0.139 0.000 1.013
I (firm has dollar debt) 1,179 0.651 0.476 0.000 1.000
Dollar assets over lagged assets 1,186 0.058 0.164 –0.029 1.008
Net foreign exchange derivatives 1,325 0.007 0.043 –0.153 0.562
   position over lagged assets
I (firm has derivatives) 1,326 0.141 0.348 0.000 1.000
Exposure (dollar debt – forwards – 1,181 0.027 0.169 –1.008 0.648
   dollar assets) over lagged assets
Cash flow over lagged assets 1,326 0.072 0.185 –1.584 3.209
Exports over lagged assets 1,309 0.053 0.156 0.000 1.379
Exports over sales 1,309 0.098 0.229 0.000 1.027
Lagged capital over assets 1,326 0.772 0.451 0.000 4.833
Source: See appendix.
Our main measure of firm performance is investment in fixed capital,
measured as the change in gross fixed assets. Accounting standards in
Chile only contemplate revaluations of fixed assets for consumer price
index (CPI) inflation, making it possible to separate investment from
changes in the accounting valuation of capital goods.
Our main measure of currency exposure is foreign currency debt (D*),
the book value of foreign currency liabilities converted into local currency.
Chilean accounting standards dictate that conversion of debt from foreign
to local currency values be carried out using the exchange rate at the time
at which the balance sheet is reported. We augment this variable with a
measure of foreign currency assets (A*), which is the local currency value
of fixed assets that are indexed to a foreign currency instead of the local
CPI, and the nominal value of outstanding currency derivatives contracts
with domestic banks. To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive
dataset of emerging market firms to include information on the currency
composition of both sides of the balance sheet.
One of the main questions we seek to answer in this paper is whether
firms match the currency composition of assets and liabilities. To answer
this question, we construct additional variables that proxy for α. The
first is a tradable dummy, that takes a value of one for firms in
agriculture, manufacturing, and mining and zero otherwise. Data on
the sector composition of output is reported in the FECU, and we also
add firm-level data on FOB export shipments collected from the Chilean
Customs Office. We convert the export data from dollars to pesos using
the year-end exchange rate.
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To explore the relation between investment and currency exposure,
we control for additional determinants of investment. The first of these
is earnings, defined as net operational earnings plus depreciation. Since
we wish to identify the effects of leverage (in particular, leverage in
dollars) on investment, we follow Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) in using
a measure of earnings that does not depend on the firm’s debt choice.
This measure of cash flow also excludes gains (or losses) from exchange
rate changes, which allows us to isolate the effects of exchange rate
fluctuations on revenues and costs from its effects on the valuation of
assets and liabilities.
Some of our specifications include measures of the ratio of the book
to market value of assets and average q ratios as control variables.
Both of these require data on market capitalization. We obtain this
data directly from the Chilean stock exchange. In all cases, the values
we use correspond to closing prices and outstanding shares in December.
Data on the use of derivatives at the firm level is scarce in the
literature in general, mostly because regulatory entities have only
recently imposed the obligation to report this kind of transaction. Chile
is no exception. Homogeneous data on derivative use from the notes to
the financial statements is only available since 2001.7 To overcome
this limitation, we obtained access to an additional source of derivative
data: the register of notional values of foreign currency derivatives
outstanding with Chilean banks (F*). The main advantage of this series
is that it is available since 1993. On the other hand, derivative
transactions that do not include a domestic bank are excluded. This
seems to be a fairly minor problem in our sample. Differences in 2001
and 2002 between the nominal amounts reported by firms in the notes
to their financial statements and the notional amounts reported by
banks are minimal.
Although we use the longer derivatives series from the Central Bank
of Chile in all of the regressions, the notes to the financial statements
provide interesting additional information on the use of currency
derivatives in Chile in. The notes provide contract-by-contract
information for all derivative transactions, covering all derivative
instruments and underlying assets. Based on the data for the period
7. In October 2000, the SVS modified the regulations that define how to
report derivative transactions in the complementary notes to the balance sheet
data. In the new norm, the SVS explicitly clarifies the obligation to report
derivatives and identifies which information to disclose. Before 2000, the norm
was not clear enough to ensure that every single transaction would be informed,
leaving this decision up to the firm. The data that comes from the complementary
notes is thus trustworthy only since 2001.
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2001–02, we observe three important stylized facts. First, Chilean firms
use derivatives contracts primarily to cover exchange rate exposure. In
fact, 73 percent of the total number of contracts reported in the period
(385) corresponds to foreign currency contracts. Second, the most
common instrument used to cover exchange rate risk is the forward. If
we restrict our sample to foreign currency contracts, 86 percent are
forwards contracts. Third, derivatives contracts are established over
relatively short periods, with an average duration of less than one year
(ten months).
Finally, we build four indicator variables to control for differences
in firm ownership. The variable ADR measures whether the firm’s
stock trades on a U.S. stock exchange in the form of American
depositary receipts (ADRs) in any given year. The variable GRUPO is a
dummy variable that indicates whether a firm was part of a
conglomerate (as defined by the SVS) in 2003. AFP is dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the Chilean pension fund administrators
(AFPs) may hold stock from the firm without restrictions. We construct
the variable using information provided by the Superintendcy of Pension
Fund Administrators (the Superintencia de Administradores de Fondos
de Pension, or SAFP). We exclude the stocks of financial intermediaries
such as banks, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual fund
administrators, and investment funds administrators on the stock
exchange. The last of the ownership variables is FOREIGN, a dummy
variable for firms controlled by foreign multinationals. This variable is
constructed in two steps. First, we pooled the most recent information
from the SVS, Economática, and Worldscope on shareholder composition.
We then used Lexis Nexis, the corporate affiliations Database, and the
Mergers and Acquisitions Database to cross-check the nationality of
the main shareholder or parent company. Of these four variables, all
but GRUPO are time varying.
We modify all accounting variables in the followings three ways.
First, we inflate or deflate our data to 1996 values using December-to-
December changes in the consumer price index. Second, we drop all
firm-year observations if the accounting data are not self-consistent,
because data on foreign currency liabilities and assets are inputted by
hand. In particular, we drop observations if the ratios of dollar debt
over total liabilities, dollar assets over total assets, exports over total
sales, and short-term liabilities over total liabilities are outside the
range (–0.1, 1.1). We also drop observations if the ratio of forward position
over total assets is outside the range (–1.1, 1.1). Finally, we drop outliers
of our key left-hand-side and right-hand-side variables. To do so, we
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construct a z score using the sample mean and standard deviation,
and we then drop firm-year observations that have |z| > 2.
Because we are interested in the effects of a devaluation on firms
holding dollar debt, in the analysis below we interact D*, A*, and F*
with changes in the real exchange rate, Δe. Our definition of e (the
nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, scaled by the local CPI)
is consistent with the inflation adjustments described above. In all the
specifications we report, we measure Δe as the log change in the real
exchange rate between Decembers of successive years. Using e on
inflation-adjusted values of debt is equivalent to using the nominal
exchange rate on current values. According to this definition, a
devaluation leads to a higher value of e.
4. THE EFFECTS OF CURRENCY EXPOSURE ON FIRM
PERFORMANCE
Our empirical specification in this section can be motivated with a
simple framework in which the optimal stock of capital is a function of
the real exchange rate (due to the competitiveness effect) and the real
value of previous-period liabilities (due to a balance sheet effect).
Specifically, assume that the log of the optimal capital stock, kt*, is
given by
ke P tt t
∗ =− αθ ,
where α measures the elasticity of kt* to the real exchange rate, θ
represents the elasticity of the log of the optimal capital stock to leverage,
and Pt is the real (inflation-adjusted) value of previous-period liabilities,
which serves as a proxy for net worth. In the presence of quadratic
adjustment costs, investment (It) will be a fraction (λ) of the gap between
the frictionless capital stock and lagged capital, so that
Ie P k tt t t =− − ( ) − λα θ 1 . (2)
The key mechanism we wish to test is how a depreciation alters
investment by inflating the domestic-currency value of debt. To
incorporate this mechanism in the previous equation, consider that the
real value of previous-period liabilities is given by
PDeP tt t t ≈+ −
∗
− 11 Δ ,  (3)
where D*t–1 is lagged dollar debt and Δet the log change in the real
exchange rate. The real value of the firm’s debt rises if it holds foreign
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currency debt and the exchange rate goes up faster than the domestic-
price level. This is, of course, a purely mechanical effect.
Our basic empirical specification (for firm i in year t) follows directly
from equations (2) and (3):
() () ,, 1, 1 , 1 , 1 , i t i t ti t i ti t i t t t i t ID e P e k D y
∗∗
−− − − =−γ Δ +δ +λ α −λ +φ + +ω +υ ,  (4)
We estimate versions of equation (4) on our sample of firms for the
period 1995–2003. The key explanatory variable in our analysis is the
interaction of lagged dollar debt, D*i,t–1, with the log change in the real
exchange rate, Δet.
We can interpret the estimated coefficient on this interaction in
two ways. The first, which follows directly from the framework presented
in this section, is the effect of exogenous changes in the real value of
total liabilities on firm investment. The second follows from a difference
in difference approach, in which the estimated coefficient on the
interaction between lagged dollar debt and the change in the real
exchange rate (D*i,t–1•Δet) indicates whether firms holding dollar
liabilities invest significantly less than their counterparts in periods
following a devaluation.
In addition to the (D*i,t–1•Δet) interaction, we include lagged
foreign-currency-denominated debt to absorb any preexisting differences
among firms with different levels of dollar indebtedness. Such differences
might have prevailed in the absence of movements in the real exchange
rate(for example, if expanding firms were more likely to issue dollar
debt than stagnant ones). We also include sets of year and firm-specific
dummies, yt and ωi. The year dummies capture aggregate shocks
common to all firms in our sample, including changes in the real
exchange rate. The firm-level dummies capture time-invariant
differences across firms in the optimal level of capital. Finally, we include
a series of proxies for αi, the elasticity of k* to the real exchange rate.
We discuss these proxies and additional controls below.
4.1 Main Results
Table 2 presents estimates of the reduced effect on investment of
holding dollar debt during a depreciation. The key variable here is the
interaction between lagged dollar debt and the change in the real
exchange rate. This interaction will indicate whether firms holding
dollar debt invest relatively less that those holding peso debt in periods
following a depreciation.
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The sample covers the period 1995–2003. It includes two large
depreciations in 1999 and 2001 (both approximately 10 percent in real
terms) and a large appreciation in 2003. In addition, the levels of foreign
currency debt exhibit substantial cross-firm variation, which allows
us to identify differential responses of firms to a depreciation (or
appreciation).
All specifications include firm fixed effects to control for time-
invariant firm differences in the optimal capital stock, as well as year
dummies to capture the shocks common to all firms. Following equation
(4), we also include the lagged dollarization ratio to control for previous-
period differences in firms with higher or lower dollar debt. Lagged
total leverage is included as an additional control.
Column 1 includes only the interaction between dollar debt and the
change in the real exchange rate (D*•Δe). As in previous studies for
Chile, the estimated coefficient is not negative: firms with more dollar
debt do not invest relatively less in periods following a depreciation. At
the same time, the estimated coefficient on lagged leverage is negative
as expected, suggesting a negative balance sheet effect from outstanding
debt commitments.
As discussed above, the estimated coefficient on (D*•Δe) will be
biased upwards if firms holding dollar debt also see their current and
future profits expand following a depreciation. To control for this bias,
columns 2 through 4 include interactions between changes in the real
exchange rate and two proxies for the elasticity of income to the real
exchange rate a: the ratio of exports over assets and a dummy for firms
in the tradable sector. In both cases the estimated coefficient on the
interaction term is positive—significantly so in the case of the tradable
dummy interaction. The estimated coefficient on (D*•Δe) remains
insignificant, although marginally more negative that in column 1.
The discussion so far in this section, and indeed in most of the
empirical literature on firm-level currency balance sheet effects, focuses
on dollar debt as the only mechanism through which a change in e can
have balance sheet effects. By doing so, we are ignoring the fact that
firms may also hold dollar-denominated assets, such as current assets
in a foreign bank or offshore investments, and that the inflated value of
these sources of income following a depreciation will offset the negative
balance sheet effect of dollar liabilities. This is a necessary simplification
in many cases given the absence of data on the currency composition of
assets, but it can introduce substantial biases into the estimation of
the balance sheet effects of a depreciation in a country such as Chile,
where domestic firms hold significant foreign assets. In our sample,
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the average ratio of dollar assets to total assets is 5.8 percent, which is
very close to the 9.3 percent average of dollar liabilities.
With this in mind, we include an additional interaction between
dollar assets and the change in the real exchange rate (A*•Δe) (see
columns 5 and 6). As expected, the coefficient on the interaction is
positive, since firms holding dollar assets see their fixed capital
investment go up by relatively more than firms holding only peso assets.
This, in itself, suggests a balance sheet effect: firms whose liabilities
fall relative to total assets are perceived as less risky, face a lower cost
of external finance, and consequently have a higher optimal capital
level than do firms with a stable or rising ratio of liabilities to total
assets.
Once the effect of (A*•Δe) is considered, the estimated coefficient on
(D*•Δe) falls, becoming negative and significant. This confirms our
prior: the insignificant coefficient on (D*•Δe) in column 1, and in many
of the empirical papers so far, is due to omitted variables that are
positively correlated with dollar debt. The reason is matching. Firms
that hold dollar debt also have dollar assets (which offsets the balance
sheet effect) and export a larger share of their output (which also offsets
the negative balance sheet effect).
Finally, we control for differential effects of changes in the exchange
rate on firm cash flow that are not captured by the interactions between
tradable sectors and the exchange rate and exporting firms and the
exchange rate. The specification reported in column 7 includes a measure
of cash flow from operations. As expected, the cash flow variable is
positive and highly significant, measuring relaxed credit constraints
stemming from improved net worth and changes in the marginal product
of capital.
Our results presented thus far suggest, first, that firms match the
currency composition of their income and assets with that of their
liabilities. As a result, those firms holding dollar debt during a
depreciation see the value of their profits and assets expand in line
with the value of their liabilities. The negative balance sheet effect of
the exchange rate on debt is offset by the positive balance sheet effect of
the exchange rate on assets and profits. Second, our results suggest
substantial balance sheet effects: exogenous changes in leverage brought
about by inflated peso values of debt have significant effects on
investment. In our sample, the investment-to-asset ratio of firms holding
50 percent of their debt in foreign currency is 5 percent of assets lower
that their peso-indebted counterparts following a 20 percent real
depreciation (similar to the 2001 depreciation in Chile). This difference
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is sizeable considering a sample mean of 4 percent. Third, from a
measurement perspective, these result highlight the importance of
having a measure of total balance sheet exposure to determine the effect
of a depreciation in investment and output.
The Chilean derivatives market, in particular the market for
currency derivatives, has expanded substantially in recent years.
Although average net positions are still small in relation to total assets,
they are no longer negligible, and in the case of some firms, they
substantially alter the level of net (or uncovered) dollar debt. To explore
the effects of these derivative positions on firm-level investment, column
8 includes an interaction between the real depreciation and net foreign
exchange derivative position over assets in the previous period (F*•e).
The estimated coefficient in positive and significant, meaning that in
periods following a depreciation, firms holding long foreign exchange
derivative positions invest relatively more than firms that do not.
Arguably, what matters for the effect of derivatives on output is not
the total change in the real exchange rate, but the deviation from the
change preestablished in the contract. We address this concern by using
interest rate differentials to construct a measure of deviations of realized
depreciation from the depreciation implicit in the forward contract, Δeu.
Assuming covered interest parity,
() 11
u
tt t t ee r r
∗
−− Δ= Δ − − ,
where rt–1 is the rate on UF-indexed debt for 90–365 days and r*t–1
is the dollar lending rate in the domestic financial system for the same
period.8 According to this construction, most of the large depreciations
were unexpected, even the 1999 depreciation. We therefore do not expect
our results to vary substantially when we include an interaction of
derivative positions with Δet
u. Indeed, the estimated coefficient (reported
in column 9) is very similar to our previous result using total exchange
rate movements.
A peculiarity of Chilean accounting norms is that certain firms are
allowed to keep their accounts in dollars. Because these firms are allowed
to revalue their fixed assets by changes in the nominal exchange rate,
part of our measure of investment may simply be driven by changes in
the prices of preinstalled assets. To correct for this, we introduce an
8. The Unidad de Fomento (UF) is an inflation-indexed unit of account that is
commonly used in Chilean financial transactions.
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interaction between the lagged capital stock and the change in the real
exchange rate for those firms with dollar accounting (see column 10).
This component controls for the effects of mechanical revaluations on
investment. The estimated coefficient on the (A*•Δe) interaction falls
considerably, but it is still significant. The estimated coefficient on the
(D*•Δe) interaction remains negative and statistically significant.
The absolute value of the estimated coefficients on dollar debt, dollar
assets, and currency derivatives are similar, and an F test fails to
reject the hypothesis that all three coefficients are equal. We thus build
an accounting measure of currency mismatch (E*), equal to dollar debt
net of assets and the net long position in foreign exchange derivatives
E* = D* – A* – F*. In column 11, we repeat our baseline estimation of
investment and include an interaction between exposure and changes
in the real exchange rate (E*•Δe). As expected, the estimated coefficient
on the interaction (E*•Δe) is negative and significant at conventional
confidence level. The estimated coefficient implies that a difference in
exposure of 50 percent of assets will lead (all things equal) to nearly 3
percent lower investment if the currency depreciates by 20 percent.
Finally, in column 12 we deviate from the difference-in-differences
approach we have followed so far and estimate an empirical specification
that follows directly from equation (4). To do so, we include the lagged
capital stock. The main result remains unchanged: the estimated
coefficient on (E*•Δe) is negative and significant. As expected, the
estimated coefficient on lagged capital stock is negative and significant.
We use the specification from column 12 as our baseline result in the
tables that follow.
Summing up, we find evidence of sizeable balance sheet effects and
of firm-level matching. These results are robust to a series of alternative
specifications and firm level controls.9
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
By focusing exclusively on exchange rate fluctuations, we have
ignored the fact that many of the exchange rate changes in our sample
occur simultaneously with changes in the supply (and cost) of foreign
and domestic credit. For example, firms holding dollar debt might be
 9. In addition to the specification reported here, we carried out the following
additional robustness tests: estimates using lagged investment and interaction of
Dln(real exchange rate) with exports and tradables; estimates using lagged
investment and firm fixed effects based on the Arellano-Bond methodology; estimates
that drop all observations in which E* is zero, to control for right-hand-side variable
censoring bias. In all cases, our main results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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less sensitive to changes in domestic interest rates than firms holding
peso liabilities. If domestic rates rise in periods of a depreciation because
the Central Bank is defending the currency, then our coefficient on the
(E*•Δe) interaction would be biased upward (toward zero). Alternatively,
the large negative coefficient on the (E*•Δe) interaction could be the
result of rising external capital costs and a tightening of foreign credit
constraints that coincide with periods of depreciation.
Furthermore, exposure to exchange rate fluctuations is by no
means the only aggregate shock that affects firm output and investment
decisions. It is therefore informative to see how aggregate credit shocks
(domestic and foreign) have differential effects on firms with different
financial structures. To control for changing credit conditions, we
estimate the investment regressions including an indicator of domestic
credit conditions (namely, the domestic interest rate) and an indicator
of external credit conditions (the return on the Emerging Market Bond
Index, or EMBI, bond basket). In each case, we interact the
macroeconomic variable with our measure of currency exposure and
the ratio of dollar debt to total assets. We also interact the
macroeconomic variables with a measure of the firm’s maturity
mismatch.10 The risk of maturity mismatch for emerging market
firms has received almost as much attention in recent years as the
risk of currency mismatch. Although business assets are
(stereotypically) installed for the long term and are therefore illiquid,
capital market frictions and distortions may induce firms to issue
debt with relatively short maturity. Should aggregate credit conditions
shift suddenly, these firms would be unable to renew their debt and
thus might have to curtail investment and perhaps liquidate.
Table 3 shows the results obtained for investment after including
aggregate credit variables. The (E*•Δe) interaction is significant and
negative even after we include this additional set of controls. Moreover,
the point estimates change only slightly. Most of the additional
coefficients estimated have the expected signs, but they are not
significant at conventional confidence levels. We do, however, obtain
interesting results for the interactions with the maturity mismatch
variable. All things equal, firms with more short-term debt relative to
short-term assets react more strongly to hikes in the domestic interest
rates than do firms with a lower ratio.
10. We tested the robustness of our results to a series of additional interactions
(not report in the table). At the firm level we used short term debt, log(assets), and
total leverage. At the macroeconomic level, we used net capital inflows, changes
in the stock of bank loans to the private sector, a dummy for sudden stops (as
defined by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía, 2004), and London interbank offered rates
(LIBOR) on dollar loans. These results are available on request.
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Differential balance sheet effects across firms
The sample-average effect presented above was strongly negative,
but this might mask differences in balance sheet effects across groups of
firms. Indeed, we would expect the estimated coefficient on the (E*•Δe)
interaction to be relatively smaller (in absolute terms) for firms that we
would consider a priori less credit constrained or financially stronger.
Table 4 partitions the sample by predetermined firm characteristics.
Column 1 replicates our baseline results, while columns 2 through 5
introduce an additional interaction between the (E*•Δe) variable and
one of four indicator variables. The first of these is a dummy that takes
a value of one for firms that are eligible to be included in the AFP portfolio.
Two previous studies for Chilean firms have found that investment by
firms in this category is less correlated with cash flow and less sensitive
to leverage than is the investment of firms that are not in the AFP
portfolios (Medina and Valdés, 1998; Gallego and Loayza, 2000). The
additional three dummy variables were described above: a dummy for
foreign ownership, a dummy for firms with ADRs, and a dummy for
firms belonging to a financial conglomerate.11 All the specifications also
include the indicator variable, its interaction with total leverage, and its
interaction with De, although only the coefficients on (E*•Δe) and the
triple interaction are reported. Structuring the specification in this
manner allows us to estimate how the effect of (E*•Δe) among the
indicated set of firms differs from the rest of the sample.
When we interact our measure of exposure with the AFP dummy
and the ADR dummy, the estimated coefficient is positive, suggesting
that less credit constrained firms are less vulnerable to the balance sheet
effects of currency exposure. The interaction has the opposite sign,
however, in the case of the foreign and financial conglomerate dummies.
These regressions have been estimated very imprecisely, so these findings
must be taken with caution. We have no explanation for the results of
either the foreign dummy or the financial conglomerate dummy.
5. FOREIGN CURRENCY HEDGING BY CHILEAN
NONFINANCIAL FIRMS
The previous section provides empirical support of a strong balance
sheet effect arising from the interaction of foreign debt and exchange
rate depreciations after controlling for differences in the composition of
11. We exclude those periods from the sample in which a firm changes
categories. This explains the smaller sample than in previous specifications.
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the balance sheet and net operational income. The evidence also suggests
that Chilean nonfinancial corporations actively use foreign debt as a
hedge for other sources of  foreign currency exposure. This section studies
the hedging behavior of Chilean firms during the sample period. We
estimate a set of regressions to examine the extent of currency matching
in our sample and the relation between hedging and those variables
identified in the corporate finance literature to explain risk aversion in
nonfinancial corporations.
5.1 Dollar Debt and Productive Structure
In this section, we evaluate the first prediction of the mean variance
framework we presented in the previous section—namely, that firms
match the currency composition of their liabilities with that of their
assets and income. To do so, we estimate the following equation on
pooled firm-level data for the period 1996–2002
it it it β= δ α+ υ,  (5)
in which for firm i in period t, βit is a measure of dollar debt to total
assets and αit is the set of variables introduced in the previous section
that proxy for the elasticity of firm income to the real exchange rate
(specifically, direct exports as a share of total sales; a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if the firm is in the agriculture, mining, or
manufacturing sector; and the ratio of dollar-denominated assets to
total assets).
Table 5 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for the
ratio of dollar debt to assets. Column 1 includes the tradable dummy
(agriculture, mining, or manufacturing), while column 2 includes a set
of dummies for one-digit International Standard Industrial Classification
(ISIC) sectors (not reported). Because βit is left-hand censored at zero,
we also estimate equation (5) using a Tobit method (see columns 3 and
4). In all four specifications, the estimated coefficients on exports and
dollar assets are positive and highly significant. The coefficients are
also sizeable. Using the estimated coefficients from column 1, we find
that the fraction of dollar-denominated liabilities over assets is 6.5
percent higher in firms that export 50 percent of their output than in
firms that sell their output domestically. Similarly, firms with a 50
percent share of dollar-denominated assets have, on average, ratios of
dollar debt to assets that are 13 percent higher than firms with primarily
peso- or UF-denominated debt. The tradable dummy is positive and
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significant in column 3: even after we control for dollar assets and
exports, dollar liabilities are 3 percent higher (as a percent of total
assets) than in nontradable sectors.
We obtain qualitatively identical results when we measure β as the
ratio of dollar debt to total debt (in columns 5 through 8), when we
replace β with an indicator variable for firms that hold dollar debt
(column 9 and 10), and when we measure β as dollar debt over assets
net of derivative positions (columns 11 and 12).
In sum, we find strong evidence that firms match the currency
composition of their debt with that of their accounting assets and income
streams. Effective foreign currency exposure is therefore substantially
smaller than what foreign currency debt suggests, so that in periods of
depreciation we expect the negative balance sheet effects of dollar debt
to be offset (or reversed) by the positive balance sheet effects of dollar
assets and income.
5.2 Structural Determinants of Derivative Use
What ultimately matters for firm performance is the net exposure
to exchange rate shocks. Nevertheless, in our sample derivative positions
are relatively small vis-à-vis total dollar debt, so the results for net
dollar debt (dollar debt net of long foreign exchange derivative positions)
are driven to a large extent by the debt component. We therefore present
some additional results for the determinants of derivative use in table
6. In columns 1 and 2, the left-hand-side variable is the nominal value
of net derivative positions over total assets; in columns 3 and 4, the
left-hand-side variable is an indicator variable for firms holding any
form of foreign exchange derivative.
The estimated coefficient on dollar debt is positive and significant
at conventional confidence levels in all specifications. Firms holding
dollar debt hold larger long positions in foreign exchange derivatives
and are, in turn, more likely to hold any form of foreign exchange
derivative than firms that do not hold dollar debt. On the other hand,
the estimated coefficients on the ratio of exports to sales and the ratio of
dollar assets to total assets are negative and significant only in columns
1 and 2. When we control for dollar debt, firms exporting a large share
of their sales and firms with a large share of dollar-denominated assets
hold significantly lower long derivative positions. The estimated
coefficients on exports and dollar assets are not significant in columns
3 and 4 since long positions are treated identically to short positions in
the dummy variable.
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Table 6. Determinants of Derivative Usea
Net derivatives/ total assets I (dollar derivatives > 0)
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dollar assets / total assets –0.040 –0.039 –0.179 0.122
(0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.578) (0.534)
Exports / sales –0.037 –0.036 –0.426 –0.008
(0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.358) (0.320)
Tradable 0.000 0.543
(0.005) (0.209)***
Dollar debt / total assets 0.129 0.129 2.613 2.428
(0.039)*** (0.040)*** (0.495)*** (0.506)***
Summary statistic
No. observations 1075 1075 1078 1078
R2 0.13 0.13 –– ––
Sector dummies No Yes No Yes
Source: Authors’ calculations.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. *** Statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
a. The dependent variable is as detailed in each column. The estimation method is OLS in columns 1 and 2 and
probit in columns 3 and 4.  The net derivative position is the notional value of the net long position of foreign
exchange derivatives with domestic banks. Tradable firms are those in ISIC sectors 1 through 3 (agriculture,
mining, and manufacturing). Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.3 and 4 since long
positions are treated identically to short positions in the dummy variable.
Hence, firms in our sample use derivatives as a complement to real
hedges. That is, firms use derivatives to offset the balance sheet risk of
dollar debt when their income is not correlated with the real exchange rate.
5.3 Currency Exposure and Risk Aversion
If we control for a and the relative cost of domestic and foreign
credit (τ + ε), the level of exposure to currency shocks should be lower
for more risk-averse firms than for risk-loving firms (that is, μ should
be higher). To test this prediction empirically, we estimate a measure
of excess currency exposure for firms over the period 2000–02. We do
this in two stages. In the first, we estimate a regression of dollar debt
against our proxies for α (exports, sector, and dollar assets) and against
the measure of μ. The first terms capture matching; the second term
captures possible correlations between μ and ε, the idiosyncratic
component of expected interest. In the second stage, we calculate the
absolute deviations between the fitted values from the first stage and
observed net dollar debt (net of derivatives), and we then regress them
on μ. Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients for the second stage of
this estimation for data pooled over the period 2000–02. Each cell reports
207-252 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:51 235236 Kevin Cowan, Erwin Hansen, and Luis Ó. Herrera
the estimated coefficient and standard error of univariate regressions of
excess net dollar debt against the respective measure of risk aversion or,
in the case of the liquidity and investment opportunities variables, the
coefficients from a regression that also includes the log of total assets.
Table 7. Corporate Determinants of Currency Exposurea
Explanatory variable (1) Expected sign of the correlation
Ownership
Log (total assets) 0.018*** +
(0.003)
I (ADR) 0.081*** +
(0.024)
I (foreign) 0.043*** +
(0.013)
I (AFP) 0.020** +
(0.009)
I (GRUPO) 0.026** +
(0.012)
Liquidity risk
Current assets / current liabilities –0.001* +
(0.000)
Accrued interest / earnings from operations   0.002 –
(0.002)
Investment opportunities
Ratio of lagged  investment to assets  0.023 –
(0.031)
ln (market-to-book ratio) –0.004** –
 (0.002)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. *** Statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
a. The table reports estimated coefficients for univariate regressions between excess dollar debt and each
of the variables reported in the table. Excess dollar debt is defined as the absolute value of the error term
in a regression of dollar debt on firm productive structure, as detailed in  column 2 of table 5. In the case
of liquidity risk variables and investment opportunities variables, the regression also includes total assets
as a control. All liquidity variables are once lagged. I (AFP) is a dummy variable for firms eligible to be
included in the portfolio of pension fund regulators, I (foreign) is a dummy for firms owned by foreign
corporations, I (ADR) is a dummy for firms listing ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange, and I (GRUPO)
is a dummy for firms belonging to a conglomerate in 2002 as defined by the SVS. Liquidity and investment
opportunity variables are as defined in text. Firm ownership data are from various sources. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
The first section of table 7 reports the estimated coefficients for
variables we believe a priori to be correlated with credit constraints.
The first is firm size. A series of empirical studies argues that large
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firms are less credit constrained than small firms because of fixed costs
in information disclosure. The estimated coefficient is consistent with
this hypothesis: large firms hold net foreign debt positions that are, on
average, further from the matching composition than small firms, and
these firms are therefore more exposed (in terms of their balance sheet,
at least) than small firms. This result is also consistent with the effect
of size limitations in the domestic market.
The next two variables measure foreign ownership, either via the
U.S. stock market (in the case of firms issuing ADRs) or directly, as
part of a foreign conglomerate (in the case of firms owned by foreign
corporations). In both cases we estimate a positive and significant
coefficient, which suggests that these firms are less credit constrained
that their counterparts.
Several empirical papers for Chile group Chilean firms according
to their eligibility for pension fund investment, the idea being that
firms eligible for AFP portfolios will be less credit constrained than
ineligible firms. For a start, firms eligible for AFP investment can
access a larger pool of accumulated wealth. In addition, if there are
fixed costs to monitoring, then AFP-eligible firms will be closely
monitored by the investment managers in the AFPs, reducing the
degree of information asymmetry. With this in mind, we include a
dummy variable for firms classified by the SAFP as eligible for AFP
investment as a proxy for μ.
Finally, we include the GRUPO dummy, for firms belonging to
financial conglomerates. We find a positive and significant coefficient,
as was the case for the ADR, foreign ownership, and AFP dummies.
The next section of table 7 includes variables that measure liquidity
risk. As discussed above, we expect firms with high liquidity risk to
minimize exposure to currency fluctuations. However, the estimated
coefficients for the coverage ratio is not significant at conventional
confidence levels, and the estimated coefficient of the current ratio is
the opposite of what we expect. These results are robust to using
alternative liquidity measures (not reported in the table), including the
quick ratio, total leverage, short-term debt, and the maturity mismatch.
Although the approach we follow here is relatively standard in the
corporate finance literature, these puzzling results suggest that our
specification suffers from endogeneity issues. Lagging the right-hand-
side variable, as we do in this table, only addresses part of the problem.
For example, an omitted firm-level variable that is negatively correlated
with credit constraints would drive up leverage and at the same time
lead to higher dollar exposure, as we find in the table.
207-252 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:51 237238 Kevin Cowan, Erwin Hansen, and Luis Ó. Herrera
Finally, the last part of table 7 shows the results for two variables
that proxy for investment opportunities: a lagged moving average of
investment over assets and the log of the market-to-book ratio. The sample
drops significantly once the market-to-book variable is included because
a substantial share of our firms are not listed. We fail to find a statistically
significant effect of lagged investment, but the estimated coefficient on
the market-to-book ratio is negative and significant, as expected.
6. EXCHANGE RATE REGIME, NET EXPOSURES, AND THE
BALANCE SHEET EFFECT
In this section, we focus on the time dimension of our panel of firms
to examine the impact of the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime
in the late 1990s on currency mismatches and the size of the balance
sheet effect among Chilean firms.
This shift in the policy regime affected the two macroeconomic
variables that explain currency mismatches in the mean-variance
framework: interest rate differentials and exchange rate volatility. The
economywide differentials between domestic and foreign borrowing costs
declined, while exchange rate volatility increased. In the period prior to
1998, the annualized standard deviation of monthly depreciations of
the dollar-UF exchange rate was 2.4 percent. It doubled to 4.4 percent
after the floating of the peso in September 1999 (see table 8).
 Accordingly, we expect that the new policy regime created greater
incentives for firms to hedge and reduce their currency risk exposures.
We further expect the reduction to be sharper in firms that have
relatively weak balance sheets and are likely to face capital market
imperfections and financial constraints. Both predictions imply that
the empirical relevance of the adverse effect of exchange rate
depreciations on balance sheets should have declined in Chile after 1999.
6.1 Floating and Currency Risk Exposure in
Chilean Firms
In this subsection, we review evidence on the evolution of currency
risk exposure across firms in our sample. We begin with a look at
different average measures of exposure to foreign exchange risk, and
then we reestimate the matching regressions of the previous section to
examine changes in the behavior of firms after the shift to the floating
exchange rate regime.
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All aggregate measures of foreign exchange exposure show a similar
pattern (see figure 1): an initial phase of rising currency mismatches
from 1995 to 1998, a significant drop through 1999 and 2000, and
relative stability in the following two years. Dollar debt increased between
1995 an 1998 from 20 percent of total liabilities to 27 percent, but in
the following two years it fell back to 20 percent of total liabilities (18
percent when adjusted for the depreciation of the real exchange rate)
and then stayed at that level. Similarly, hedging activity increased
sharply during 1998 and 1999 and then stabilized. Firms net (and gross)
positions on forward markets ere negligible until 1997, after which the
net positions increased sharply, reaching around 4 percent of total
liabilities or 10 percent of foreign currency debt.
Similarly, an alternative measure of net accounting exposure in
the balance sheet of firms—namely, foreign currency debt adjusted for
foreign currency assets and derivatives—increased gradually from 1995
to 1997. It then started to decline, quite sharply in the years 1999 and
2000, until becoming slightly negative in the final years of our sample.
Overall, the evolution of aggregate measures of foreign exchange
exposition in our sample of firms is consistent with a reduction of
exposure after the shift in the macroeconomic policy regime.
The empirical evidence on the differential behavior of firms before
and after the changes in the macroeconomic-policy regime is shown in
table 9. We reestimate regressions on the hedging behavior of firms,
this time including a time dummy for the period prior to the adoption
of the floating exchange rate regime and other reforms. Although
changes in macroeconomic policies were implemented in 1998 and 1999,
we consider that some adjustment costs to the composition of the balance
sheet could lead to a lagged response of firms. The dummy variable
therefore covers 1995–98, and 1999 is excluded from the sample.
The results for all regressions indicate a significant drop in foreign
currency exposure or a significant increase in foreign currency hedging
after 1999. The ratio of dollar debt to total assets declines significantly
for all firms, to around 20 percent of the pre-float exposure. The dollar
debt ratio adjusted for derivatives declines further, to around 35 percent
of the pre-float exposure, and the net accounting exposure disappears
after 1999. Similarly, the net derivative position increases significantly
after 1999. As shown in the graphs for the aggregate numbers, most of
the action comes from the reduction of foreign currency debt, with a
smaller effect from the increase in derivatives.
Because we have detected an increase in the volatility of the
exchange rate in the period after 1999, we expect the drop in the
207-252 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:51 240Figure 1. Exchange Rate Exposure and Derivatives Position
in Chilean Firms
Dollar debt adjusted by Derivatives position:
forward position US$ forwards
Dollar debt adjusted by Dollar debt adjusted by
forward position and dollar assets forward position
Sources: Authors' calculations, based on data from Superintendencia Valores y Seguros (SVS) and International
Financial Statistics.
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exposure to be larger for firms with a more vulnerable financial
condition. Firms are sampled according to the variables identified
in the previous section as measures of a firm’s risk aversion. We
then test for differences in the change of the foreign exchange exposure
after 1999. To measure foreign exchange exposure, we replicate the
methodology discussed in the previous section—that is, we estimate
the matching portfolio using the dollar assets, exports, and tradable
dummies, and we then estimate deviations from this portfolio. To
allow for changes across periods in this matching relation, we
estimate the first stage allowing for different coefficients across
regimes. These coefficients will capture the differences in levels of
exposure we discussed above. In the second stage, we interact the
firm-level dummies we found to be positively correlated with higher
mismatches in the float period with the pre-float dummy. We report
these second stage results in table 10. The estimated coefficients on
the interactions are negative in all cases except the AFP dummy,
although only the interaction with the ADR dummy is significant.
This is contrary to what we expect.
Thus far, we have attributed the fall in dollar debt or average
exposure to the shift in the macroeconomic policy regime and its impact
on compressing interest rate differentials and increasing exchange
rate volatility. We have not attempted to disentangle the effects of
each of these components. To begin decomposing these two
macroeconomic effects, we reestimate our regressions of firm hedging,
incorporating the return on the EMBI bond index as a measure of the
cost of external finance and the average rate on one- to three-year
UF-denominated loans in the Chilean banking system as a measure
of the domestic interest rate.12 We report the results of these estimates
in table 11. The estimated signs on the interest rate coefficients are
as expected, with dollar debt rising when domestic rates are high and
falling with the cost of external financing. As reported in column 2,
we also obtain a positive coefficient on the pre-float dummy, even after
controlling for the interest rates individually or (as in column 3) by
the spread between the two rates.
The interest rate differentials provide an alternative way to validate
the a priori measures of credit constraints used in previous sections.
One of the predictions of the framework presented above is that interest
12. We carried out these estimations with the LIBO and EMBI rates ex ante,
with and without the unremunerated reserve requirement over a two-year entry
period; we obtained similar results.
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rate differentials have a large effect on currency exposure of firms
that are less risk averse. To test this hypothesis, we estimate
interactions between the interest rate differential and the measures
of a priori credit constraints that we found to be significant in
explaining excess net dollar debt (or exposure). In all cases, we obtain
positive coefficients (as expected), although these are only significant
for the size variable. We thus find some evidence that firms that are
less risk averse respond the most to changes in interest rate
differentials, as the cost (in terms of financial distress or missed
investment opportunities) are lower.
A higher exchange rate volatility in the post-float period is a plausible
explanation for the positive coefficient on the pre-float dummy. However,
other economywide events occurring in the same period could also be
driving our results. An alternative hypothesis to explain why firms
closed their currency mismatches after 1998 would be that they faced
an external liquidity crunch during this period that pushed them to
the local market, independently of the shift in the policy regime and
the measured interest rate spread. They had no option but to close the
currency mismatches because they could not continue borrowing abroad.
We find no compelling evidence to argue that after 1998, either the
Chilean economy was liquidity constrained in international markets or
that firms were cut off from international credit. Indeed, in January
1999 the Government was able to fund its fiscal deficit by taping into
international markets with spreads of 200 basis points, while risk
premiums on private debt had returned to 300 basis points in early
1999. Also, total private foreign debt of nonfinancial firms continued to
increase in 1998, 1999, and 2000, from US$21 billion to US$29.4 billion.
After 2000, credit spreads continued to decline, although private foreign
debt of nonfinancial firms stabilized at US$ 29 billion.
7. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature on the
balance sheet effects of currency mismatches in three ways. First, we
assemble a new firm-level database that allows us to build more
comprehensive measures of currency exposure. In addition to data on
foreign currency debt, our dataset incorporates data on firm-level
exports, foreign currency assets, and foreign currency derivative
positions. This data should allow us to correct for the omitted variables
present in many of the previous studies of balance sheet effects. Second,
we explicitly look at differences in exposure across firm-level variables
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that the corporate finance literature argues (or shows) to be correlated
with firm-level risk aversion. Finally, by looking at firm-level data for
Chile over the period 1995 to 2003, we are able to identify changes in
the level and distribution of dollar debt across two distinct policy regimes.
Before 1999, Chile had an exchange rate band and therefore an explicit
commitment to exchange rate stability. After 1999, the Central Bank
allowed the exchange rate to float freely.
As in previous studies for Chile by Benavente, Johnson, and
Morandé (2003) and Fuentes (2003), we find that firms with higher
dollar debt do not underperform their peso counterparts in periods
following a depreciation. However, once we adequately control for
differences in the currency composition of assets and income and in
net derivative positions, we find a significant balance sheet effect. In
other words, we find that currency mismatches matter when they
are correctly measured. We also find that derivatives play a role in
insulating firm-level investment from exchange rate shocks and that
the balance sheet effects are slightly smaller for firms we categorize a
priori as less credit constrained.
In line with previous firm-level studies, we find evidence of
currency matching in Chilean corporations. Firms in Chile appear to
actively minimize the risks associated with open currency positions
and choose the currency composition of their debt and their derivative
positions accordingly. They do this by matching the currency
composition of their debt with that of their income and assets and by
taking on derivatives if no real hedge is available. We also find that
exposure—as measured by deviations of dollar-debt net of derivatives
from the levels predicted by a simple regression between debt, assets,
and exports—is negatively correlated with measures of credit
constraints (or firm risk aversion) and investment opportunities. Our
results on exposure suggest that the firms that are most exposed to
currency risk are better prepared to take this risk.
Finally, we find significant changes in the level of exposure after
the exchange rate was floated in 1999. This drop is significant even
after we control for a crude measure of interest rate differentials. We
argue that one possible interpretation of these results is that the higher
exchange rate variance affects the relative risk of domestic and foreign
debt. This being the case, the evidence suggests that floating exchange
rate regimes would reduce exposure by eliminating an implicit
exchange rate insurance and forcing firms to internalize exchange
rate risk. More evidence from other emerging market economies is
needed to generalize this assertion.
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